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in many European capitals and paternalism remained pervasive throughout the political 
diplomacy of the period, other perspectives were emerging. Through innovative policy 
engagements that occurred in the late 1950s and into the 1960s, a new sense of transna-
tional purpose could be seen which presented former colonies with partnership options 
that were seemingly and practically outside the context of the historic geo-economic im-
position. Whereas some European powers continued to exert overly dismissive attitudes 
to African engagement and society, other approaches experimented with developmental 
policies that were lauded by both sides at the time. This article will look at the practice and 
policies of associationism – the outworking of the Yaoundé and Lomé agreements – and 
will look at the formative international cooperation policies of the European Community 
(EC), as it evolved through the period when former European colonies were attaining 
independence. Finally, it will survey the reasons for the demise of associationism and 
speculate on the onset of what some have described as “neo-colonalism” (Langan, 2018: 
1–32; Nkrumah, 1965).2
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Powstanie i upadek układów stowarzyszeniowych. 
Konwencje z Jaunde i Lomé
Streszczenie
Bezpośredni okres pokolonialny przyniósł szanse, a także ogromne wyzwania, dla byłych 
kolonii mocarstw europejskich. Podczas gdy mentalność kolonialna nadal przenikała wiele 
europejskich stolic, a paternalizm pozostawał wszechobecny w dyplomacji politycznej 
tamtego okresu, wyłaniały się także inne perspektywy. Dzięki nowatorskim działaniom 
politycznym pod koniec lat pięćdziesiątych i sześćdziesiątych XX wieku można było do-
strzec nowe poczucie celu ponadnarodowego dające byłym koloniom opcje partnerstwa, 
które pozornie i praktycznie pozostawały poza kontekstem historycznego przypisania 
geoekonomicznego. Podczas gdy niektóre mocarstwa europejskie nadal wykazywały zbyt 
lekceważące podejście do zaangażowania i społeczeństw w Afryce, inne eksperymento-
wały z polityką rozwojową, która była w tamtym czasie zachwalana przez obie strony. 
Artykuł ukazuje praktyki i politykę układów stowarzyszeniowych – skutki porozumień 
z Jaunde i Lomé – oraz formatywną politykę współpracy międzynarodowej Wspólnoty 
Europejskiej (WE), która ewoluowała w okresie, gdy dawne kolonie europejskie osiągały 
niezależność. Ponadto przeanalizowano przyczyny upadku stowarzyszeniowości i speku-
lacje na temat początku tego, co niektórzy określają jako „neokolonializm” (Langan, 2018: 
1–32; Nkrumah, 1965)3.
Słowa kluczowe: układy stowarzyszeniowe, konwencje z Jaunde i Lomé, kolonializm, 
polityka współpracy międzynarodowej
Kody klasyfikacji JEL: F13, F53, O19
Introduction
The influence of the European Community (EC) on the development of former 
colonies has been immense. This has been particularly the case on the continent of 
Africa, where all but two of the countries, Liberia and Ethiopia, were formally col-
onized. Given that all but a few of these countries were economically dependent on 
Member States of the Community and continued to be tied to their fortunes, the links 
between the various regions of Africa and Europe were crucial for the socio-eco-
nomic development of the continent as a whole (Langan, 2018: 119–148). Through 
3 Kolejność układów stowarzyszeniowych zawartych przez Wspólnotę Europejską (WE) to: Trak-
tat Rzymski 1958–1963; Konwencja z Jaunde I 1964–1969; Jaunde II 1969–1975; Konwencja z Lomé I 
1975–1980; Lomé II 1980–1985: Lomé III 1985–1990; Lomé IV 1990–2000; Układ z Kotonu 2000–2020.
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the legal architecture of the Treaty of Rome (25 March 1957), the structure and form 
of these relationships altered the manner in which European powers engaged with 
the colonies and affected, in a myriad of ways, their developmental potential. The 
context was also important in a Europe where racist human exhibitions of colonial 
peoples were still permitted, such as the Congolese village complete with trafficked 
African villagers at the 17 April–19 October 1958 Brussels Expo. The Treaty antici-
pated and facilitated the liberation of former colonies and carried a sense of atone-
ment at this point for the way in which the founding Member States had historically 
treated erstwhile partners and their people. It also provided the legal groundwork for 
the achievement of independence for former colonies and acted as a catalyst for new 
economic and policy arrangements. Article 182 gives some insight into the intention 
of the Community to engage with newly independent countries:
“The purpose of association shall be to promote the economic and social development 
of the countries and territories and to establish close economic relations between them 
and the Community as a whole … association shall serve primarily to further the 
interests and prosperity of the inhabitants of these countries and territories in order 
to lead them to the economic, social and cultural development to which they aspire” 
(Art. 182, TEC).
This “associationism” was understood to be reciprocal in its form and not only 
had an impact on the post-independence economies of the Global South, but also 
on the global positioning of Western Europe itself. This article will survey the com-
plications of this relationship from the perspective of the EC’s historical engagement 
with the former colonies, in Africa in particular, arguing that while much interna-
tional cooperation offered more of the same by way of institutional and ideological 
driven development policies – framed by Cold War politics – some policies carried 
far-reaching positive ramifications (Carbone, 2007; Holland, Dodge, 2012; Baba-
rinde, 1994; Grilli, 1994). Conversely, while acknowledging the efforts and financial 
commitments that have been made by various EC member states (indeed, over half 
its development aid went to Africa), the relationship still harbored fault-lines that 
continued to wrangle between the two continents. With this in mind, this article 
will also survey the manner in which certain policy interventions have contributed 
to erratic patterns of development in many regions of Africa, particularly those that 
have had a systemic impact on the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (Gruhn, 1967: 
240–269). In assessing the contribution or otherwise to development that the Treaty 
of Rome has had on Least Developed Countries (LDCs), policy-making, develop-
ment agencies, and non-governmental organizations, the article will consider the 
legacy of Western European intervention in Africa and will examine policy-based 
reasons for continued underdevelopment.
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The rollout of the Rome program was both disparate and innovative in equal 
measure as it attempted to establish a more effective international economic policy 
architecture that could be put in place to enable the EC to engage better with a rapidly 
changing Global South. The various articles related to connectivity with former colo-
nies and the eventual concretization of the principles of Rome through the Yaoundé 
and Lomé conventions represented an adaptive hegemony and a repurposing of the 
European policy framework a propos former colonies. Crucially, its progress into law 
sat parallel to the turmoil that came with the positioning and polemics of the Cold 
War and a scramble for political satellites. Furthermore, the bulk of policy initiatives 
within the Treaty pre-date this East-West global divide, and whereas the reconfig-
uration of global relationships and the ordering of the acqui communautaire argua-
bly represented a clarification of Western Europe’s aspirations in light of post-colo-
nial liberation, the effects on policy implementation proved more problematic. This 
was particularly relevant to those aspects of development and economic policy that 
were susceptible to external geo-political pressures and reflected divergent outcomes 
between the intentions of the Treaty and the actual impact of the EC development 
policy on Least Developed Countries (LDCs).
This paper aims to highlight the problems faced by former African colonies of 
EC Member States and examines the public and economic policy that was affected 
by the sequence of changes to the EC’s complex development policy. It will evalu-
ate the impact on the policy going into Yaoundé and Lomé, the specific innovative 
aspects of development relations, and the ramifications of contemporary ideological 
shifts (Holland, Doidge, 2012: 46–69). Finally, it will look at the consequences of the 
implementation of these policies on more vulnerable economies in Africa and will 
comment on how the African leaders viewed the situation.
Towards Yaoundé
The origins of the EC’s relationship with developing countries can be traced back 
to the earliest days of an integrating European market system, the 1951 Treaty of Paris 
and the Messina Conference of June 1955. The complications of colonial relations 
were something that many of the participants (particularly the Benelux countries) 
felt were outside the competence of the discussions. Indeed, the initial feeder report 
on trade co-operation, the Spaak Report of 21 April 1956, omitted references to third 
countries. It was the French government under Charles de Gaulle – not known for 
sensitivity towards colonies – which insisted during the negotiations (in May) on 
the report that any new arrangements must include “overseas territories” as implicit 
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to the French economic bloc. Indeed, this became a prerequisite to its participation. 
Entrenched in a protracted war in Vietnam until the Vietnamese victory at Dien 
Bien Phu on 7 May 1954 and running immediately into another doomed campaign 
in Algeria that very month, France needed answers to colonial issues. Consequently, 
the French government approached the integration debate from the perspective that 
financial drainage and dependency from associated overseas countries and territo-
ries (OCTs) were becoming burdensome in terms of state responsibilities and set 
about seeking to share the liabilities of the pending breakup of the empire with other 
European countries. John Ravenhill noted of the French position: “France’s move was 
shrewdly timed: by making a satisfactory agreement on provisions for its depend-
encies a sine qua non for its signature of the Treaty, French bargaining power was 
maximized” (Ravenhill, 1985: 48) This became very obvious when France was pre-
sented to the EC in its earliest manifestation as a collection of regions – even Alge-
ria appeared on the earliest maps of the European Community.
With the signing of the Treaty of Rome relations between the Community and the 
former colonies became subject to the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), which 
regulated trade with external countries. The central implementation mechanism of 
the CCP was the Common External Tariff (CET), which detailed the rules govern-
ing trade between the former colonial powers and developing countries. Article 110 
of the Treaty of Rome stated that the CCP should aim to “contribute, in the com-
mon interest, to the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abo-
lition of restrictions on international trade, and the lowering of customs barriers.” 
Attendant institutional arrangements were also a key aspect of this associationism. 
For emerging independent governments in the Global South, it meant having rep-
resentation at discussions on trade policy and economic connectivity. The names of 
the first countries to be given this “favored” status reflected where they were located 
in the international scheme of things: French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa, 
the French Trustee Territory in the Cameroons, Madagascar, Togoland, the Belgian 
Congo, Ruanda Urundi, the French Trustee Territory of Somalia and the Nether-
lands New Guinea.
From the very beginning the European Commission, the executive wing of the 
European institutional system, was delegated the remit of negotiating with third coun-
tries on issues of mutual interest. The Commission acted with instruction from the 
so-called “133 Committee,” named after the article in the Treaty of Rome regulating 
trade. From 1957 onwards, the concept of “special relations” with poorer nations, 
both in trade and aid, was built into plans for economic expansion. Article 183.3 set 
the tone where Member States had an obligation to “contribute to the investments 
required for the progressive development of these countries and territories.” For EC 
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states, this was considered as a means of keeping colonial interests alive or as a means 
of building economic capacity. The Treaty also established the European Develop-
ment Fund (EDF), which had the objective of targeting those regions most in need 
of aid and support. The six signatories of the Treaty agreed to set aside $ 581.25 mil-
lion for this fund, of which $ 511.25 million was allocated to French dependencies 
(Swann, 1995: 359). Interestingly, the dialogue and negotiations show that the drive 
for association at this stage was not entirely Eurocentric. As Denis Swann noted:
“The broad thrust of the association arrangements, which had a double character, was 
as follows. The Community undertook to reduce tariffs on goods coming from the 
dependencies in line with internal tariff disarmament … The dependent territories 
were required to reciprocate but could, however, retain protection needed for their 
development, industrialization or revenue, provided they extended to the mother 
country” (Swann, 1995: 359).
In these early stages of development cooperation, anti-colonial and pan-Afri-
can movements voiced concern about the emergence of this powerful new European 
entity and its potential effects on the development of the southern hemisphere. Kwame 
Nkrumah’s 1965 Neocolonialism was the culmination of a pan-African discussion on 
the new world order and the one-sided gravitation of geo-political relations (Nkru-
mah, 1965: Langan, 2018: 1–32). The most targeted point – made very effectively 
by Walter Rodney in How Europe Underdeveloped Africa – was that inter-African 
partnerships were being frustrated through a default form of colonialism (Rodney, 
1989). The result of concerted pressure from various voices from the Global South was 
a change in semantics and, arguably, direction. EC negotiations with African states 
in 1958 resulted in a Convention of Association and mechanisms which could enable 
18 African states and Madagascar to benefit from the new developments in Europe. 
Indeed, by 1960, these new arrangements meant that 80 per cent of trade from the 
developing countries involved was with the six states of the EC, while 98 per cent of 
all aid contributions was targeted at these states (Grilli, 1994: 15).
All the participants involved in the formation of this trading network were aware 
at an early stage of the necessity of support for developing countries and the impo-
sition that a new EC driven market system could have on former colonies. Indeed, 
between 1958 and 1962 the associated states not only achieved their independence, 
but also were to appoint diplomatic corps to the newly established EC, bringing an 
assertive and informed lobby to discussions on international cooperation. A Mem-
orandum on “Free Trade and its Conditions” (26 February 1959) – the first mem-
orandum from the Commission of the EC to the Council of Ministers – reflected 
a change in tone in some quarters in Europe:
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“… it would seem necessary that any large-scale elimination of customs barriers and 
quotas between highly developed countries on the one hand and developing countries 
on the other, should be accompanied by a concerted and active development policy. In 
point of fact, the experience shows that free trade of itself does not lead to the elimi-
nation of disparities in levels of development” (Quoted in Weigall, Stick, 1992: 118).
This missive formed the basis of the first major multilateral arrangement between 
developing states and the EC, and was named after the Cameroonian capital, Yaoundé, 
where the delegates met. The objective of this Association was to enhance existing 
trade relations between the EC and developing countries, to work towards a mutu-
ally beneficial (trade and assistance) system.
The outcome of these discussions, combined with the increasing efficiency in the 
production of key commodities such as copper and other primary products, strength-
ened the relationship between developing countries and the EC to a point where the 
former could progressively secure more favorable trade agreements from the latter. 
The expansion of EC development programs, combined with the Yaoundé Conven-
tion, encouraged other African states to enter into complementary trading negotia-
tions. It also offered a backdrop to the emergence of the growing pan-African coun-
ter-balance, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), founded on 1 May 1963 and 
the forerunner of the African Union (AU). At its founding conference, Alieu Ebrima 
Cham-Joof, the acclaimed historian and pan-Africanist, reflected on the confidence 
of the times and warned of possible dangers:
“15 years have just passed since the continental struggle for political emancipation 
started in the colonial empire. The beginning of the second phase of this struggle 
in Africa was born 7 years ago when the self-same European Powers, frightened by 
this mass struggle for political emancipation and economic stability, went to Rome 
for spiritual shelter for their undertaking and signed the treaty of Rome with deter-
mination to resist more strongly and effectively the hurricane of Africa Nationalism 
through economic struggle and manipulated under the cloak of common market. 
This through former friendly and helpful Africa would ensure the flow of supply of 
raw materials from Africa and bring in its wake a new domination of Africa through 
neo-colonialism whereby Europe would give less by the left hand and take away more 
by the right hand” (Cham-Joof, 1 May 1963).
For the developing countries and leaders engaging in this trade circle at the time, 
the benefits were, however, quantifiable and activating growth within their econo-
mies. The Convention comprised of the significant bulk of the acquis, from Part IV 
of the original EC Treaty with its tenure running five years from 1 June 1964. The 
Preamble to the Convention also contains evidence of the awareness of the key sen-
sitivity of economic capacity-building on the continent and “…the importance of 
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developing intra-African trade and cooperation as well as international economic 
relations” (EC, no date: 9; Smith, 2002: 55–56)
The framework provided a forum for the African delegations to discuss com-
mon problems and included political leaders from Burundi, Cameroon, the Central 
African Republic, Chad, Congo, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, 
Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Togo, Upper Volta and Zaire (Hol-
land, Doidge, 2012: 49). Significantly, the Convention was the first joint agreement 
between a bloc of countries from Africa represented by their indigenous political 
leadership and former colonial powers in Europe. This agreement was later renegoti-
ated and enhanced in 1969 under the Yaoundé II Convention, which served to engage 
the (by then) 24 developing states in a process of economic exchange and political 
consensus. Under the auspices of the Convention, the Associated African and Mal-
agasy States (AASM) expanded its influence by making representations to the Euro-
pean Parliament and succeeded in generating debate and action on a raft of devel-
opment policy issues. Systemic imbalance showed through, however, relatively early 
on in the process, as explained by Martin Holland and Mathew Doidge in reference 
to the allocation of funding:
“First, typically, from 1957 to 1975 only a third of EDF funds were successfully dis-
bursed during the lifetime of the respective agreements. Second, the greatest propor-
tion of EDF aid was given to infrastructural projects virtually excluding development 
of the industrial sector. As such, the EDF mirrored the bilateral practices of former 
colonial donor states” (Holland, Doidge, 2012: 52).
Compounding systemic and disbursement problems, three contextual factors 
came into play that changed the relationship between the EC and the developing 
world through to the early 1970s. These significantly altered the working partner-
ship between the African countries, European politicians and EC bureaucrats. The 
first factor was the pressure from rich oil producing countries – under the direc-
tion of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) – on developed 
nations to accept serial increases in the cost of crude oil. This had an immediate 
and detrimental effect on energy security and transport. The EC needed to rapidly 
invest in “friendly” oil producing states in the developing world or produce its own 
oil, which it eventually did through its North Sea oil fields. It was one reason for 
the United Kingdom’s (UK) “awkward” accession to the EC on 1 January 1973. Sec-
ondly, the Cold War had galvanized political allegiances within the Global South 
and became a catalyst for conflict, proxy-war and anti-imperialist struggles across 
the world, including a sequence of conflicts across the African continent (Congo, 
South Africa, Somalia, Egypt, Angola, to note a few). Thus, the stability of many 
regions, now regarded as strategically crucial in East-West relations, were threatened. 
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Thirdly, the enlargement of the EC in the early 1970s vastly increased the number 
of the Member States that had colonies and former colonies. For example, with the 
UK joining in 1973, it brought with it a global network and commonwealth trading 
partners that represented a significant bloc in its own right. India alone contained 
a fifth of the world’s population. Similarly, both Spain and Portugal brought colo-
nial networks into the EC with their accession, notably Central and South America. 
These factors cumulatively left the Yaoundé system in need of review and adaptation. 
It also set the scene for the comprehensive negotiations that led to its replacement 
by the Lomé Convention of 28 February 1975.
EC sensitivity to the unevenness of global development manifested itself on 
a number of occasions in the expansion debates and statements of the late 1960s. 
For example, a 1968 declaration by the Commission on “The Achievement of the 
Customs Union” stated that:
“Europe bears major international responsibilities … It is the leading importer of 
products from the countries of the third world. Today, in its present form, it already 
has major responsibilities to the developing countries – and these will be even more 
important tomorrow when Europe is a larger entity … it is Europe’s duty to organize 
cooperation and association with the other main groups in the world” (Weigall, Stick, 
1992: 145; Fryer, 1980: 53–54).
The Yaoundé protocol outlined the procedures for interaction between the EC 
and developing countries across the spectrum of policy areas for development coop-
eration. This protocol established, in theory, a process that enabled developing coun-
tries to work with the EC as joint stakeholders in policy formulation. The renegoti-
ation of the Yaoundé Convention moved to the challenges of a new global context 
by including more developing countries within already straining development pro-
grams. The new partnership sought to overcome fault-lines from the initial agree-
ments and take into account the contingencies arising from geo-political shifts. From 
the position of the African representatives, they were increasingly adopting the view 
that independence could pay dividends by broadening the potential for exchange. 
Consequently, the first Lomé Convention proved, by most accounts, a positive forum 
for the forty-six associates involved in the negotiations from Africa, the Caribbean 
and the Pacific region (ACP).
Signed in Lomé, the capital of Togo, this association was to operate in a manner 
which maximized trade opportunities for growth, while enhancing sustainable eco-
nomic support. From the beginning, there was an acknowledgement of the need for 
a more equitable mechanism between the EC and developing countries. The Preamble 
of Lomé outlines the need for “… a new model for relations between developed and 
developing States, compatible with the aspirations of the international community 
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towards a more just and more balanced economic order” (quoted in Bretherton, 
Vogler, 1999: 114; also see Babarinde, 1994; Hewitt, 1993). The EC participation 
in Lomé was to a large extent premised on the historic relationships with particu-
lar former colonies and the belief that it had a responsibility for the development 
of these states – especially during a period which could see the reconfiguration of 
the EC market system and European politics. Furthermore, the accession of the UK 
meant that new demands were being made on the EC. In this regard, the British 
Commonwealth arguably worked from a different understanding of development 
than that espoused by the former French colonies which had negotiated at Yaoundé. 
The concept of partnership, associationism was being altered into more of a com-
monwealth philosophy. That noted, there was a broad acceptance of the approach. 
At the signing of the Convention in 1975, Claude Cheysson, representing the Euro-
pean Commission and responsible for the negotiations that produced the first Lomé 
Convention, stated: “All this work has produced an agreement which, I say with some 
pride, is unique in the world and in history. Never before has there been any attempt 
to do anything of this kind. It is the first time in history that an entire continent has 
undertaken a collective commitment …” (cited in Faber, 2004: 1). O. A. Babarinde 
noted that the initial reception of Lomé in Africa was “jubilation” – although “pre-
mature” (Babarinde,1994: 216).
For the African leaders involved, the potential of the Association Convention was 
regional unification and building cohesiveness similar to that attained by the Euro-
pean states through the innovation of a common market. This can be recognized 
through a clause of “considerable political significance” in which the partnership 
aspired to “… the creation of customs unions or free-trade areas, either between the 
associated states and non-member countries (e.g. other African states), subject only 
to the conditions that such unions and areas are not incompatible with the princi-
ples and rules of the Association Convention” (EC, no date: 9). The outworking of 
the agreement between the years 1958 and 1969 (and expanded later) targeted eco-
nomic and social infrastructures, roads, hospitals, schools, etc. It contributed to rural 
development with irrigation and soil conservation projects, technical assistance; 
scholarships were provided together with the training of project workers and grad-
uate exchanges. The projects had, with some exceptions, to be “of general and social 
benefit and subject to public control.” Aid, grants, loans and diversification support 
were disbursed to partners to facilitate the reform of economic systems. Even the 
private sector could avail of support if it could prove it could contribute to socio-eco-
nomic development. The range of actions were extensive and financially generous and 
worked to complement other substantive contributions, such as the United Nations 
Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and (more questionable) World Bank 
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interventions (Amin, 1982: 23–30). The European states, with France very much 
in the driving seat of international development cooperation policy, found the con-
tributions and association necessary to stabilize former colonies, and the regime that 
was put in place seemed advantageous to overseas partners (Twitchett, 1980: 85–89).
In the context of the Cold War, encouraging such linkages was deemed to be 
a useful means of shoring up the Western sphere of influence. The Suez Crisis and 
the Algerian War loomed heavy over all the discussions. Counter arguments were 
also stacking up with the likes of Frantz Fanon, Amilcar Cabral and Walter Rodney 
voicing critique. Indeed, Rodney saw the emerging system as profoundly damag-
ing to Africa:
“It is also worth noting that Africa was denied the opportunity of developing healthy 
trade links with parts of the world other than Europe and Northern America. Some 
trade persisted across the Indian Ocean, but on the whole it is fair to say that the roads 
in Africa led to the seaports and the sea lanes led to Western Europe and North Amer-
ica. That kind of lopsidedness is today part of the pattern of underdevelopment and 
dependence (Rodney, 1972, 2005 edition: 230).
Investment in overseas partners provided a method of stabilizing markets and 
locking in political and economic destinies against alternatives. The political imper-
ative during this period of the “special relationship,” from the EC point of view, was 
intended to actively align former colonies. Under the terms of the Convention, devel-
opment assistance would be given to specifically enhance the economic capacity and 
infrastructure of participating countries. Priority in trading relations would be given 
to ACP states with a range of named products being offered free access to the EC 
market. Moreover, ACP export prices were protected from fluctuating markets by 
the System for the Stabilisation of Export Earnings from Products (STABEX). ACP 
states received technical assistance in certain fields to enhance market competitive-
ness, while aid programs were established to act as baseline support for moderniza-
tion. In return, ACP states had to prioritize and formalize their trading relations with 
EC Member States. Within this system, the idea of the common interest became an 
important component of trade, aid and the economic agreements reached between 
representatives from ACP countries and the Commission in Brussels. Thus, ACP 
countries could operate in such a manner that gave parity to the exchange of trade. 
It is worth noting, though, that many other developing countries were systematically 
excluded from this trade loop, including some of the most impoverished developing 
states such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.
As Yaoundé transformed into the broader Lomé agreement, it meant that ACP 
countries were offered partnership arrangements which enabled them to deal with 
their own internal developmental, strategic, and political concerns without external 
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interference. Furthermore, this Convention established a structure within which the 
economic and strategic interests of the ACP itself could be forwarded. The opera-
tional title of this body was the Committee of Ambassadors, which worked with the 
Commission on implementing the detailed provisions of the Convention. This body 
included the ACP-EC Council – which comprised of members from the Council of 
Ministers, the Commission, and a government minister from each of the ACP states 
– and an ACP-European Parliament joint assembly. With this in place and from the 
transcripts of discussions on progress at this point in the late 1970s, the Lomé system 
was recognized (by the African representatives and the EC alike) as building on the 
platform of Yaoundé and a positive departure from the traditionally exploitative rela-
tionship between European nations and the developing world. Charlotte Bretherton 
and John Vogler stated that “… the Lomé system, with its complex provisions and 
strengthened institutions, consolidated a distinctive, Community approach to devel-
opment cooperation” (Bretherton, Vogler, 1999: 118). The first round of programs, 
Lomé I, was arguably to represent a highpoint in EC development cooperation. With 
hindsight, the German government later portrayed the Lomé I arrangement as “…
one of the greatest achievements” of the EC (Erridge, 1981: 9). The first phase of 
the program, with certain qualifications (such as the bureaucracy that emerged and 
the Pan-Africanist claims of neo-colonialism) seemed to be genuinely developmen-
tal. At its core it revolved around a series of key actions: technical assistance when 
requested; partner based institutions – consensus based policies; targeted develop-
ment initiatives; a system of preferences in trade including almost all produce from 
ACP countries being given free access to the EC market; the System for the Stabili-
zation of Export Earnings from Products (STABEX) – which meant that ACP export 
prices were protected from market fluctuations; Emergency Aid when necessary; 
and the now established EDF.
Lomé and the new world order
Lomé was to be renegotiated on a five-yearly basis, with Lomé I spanning the 
years 1975–1980, Lomé II covering 1980–1985, Lomé III 1985–1990, and Lomé IV 
operating over a ten-year timescale up to 2000. On the completion of Lomé IV, the 
number of ACP countries involved had increased to 71. The provisions of Lomé as 
a system did not dramatically change over this time, but fundamental shifts in the 
global economy strengthened the influence of European interests over developing 
countries. Furthermore, changes were not only evident in the composition of the 
association, but also in the enlarged membership and enhanced economic position 
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of the EC. The nature of global market expansion and the rise of neo-liberalism 
in the 1980s – with its acceptance of predatory economic practices by larger EC 
states – saw the relationship with ACP countries (and their need for a more stable 
system of trade) generating political tensions. ACP representatives were fully aware 
that trade liberalization would leave ACP economies open and vulnerable to the 
European Union (EU) imports and Transnational Corporate (TNC) activity. With 
the accession of the three new Mediterranean states to the EC – Greece, Spain and 
Portugal – the stabilization of that region became ever more important to the EC’s 
understanding of its own position in global terms. This shifting balance of power 
in Europe and a resurgent nationalism resulted in events such as the impending 
breakup of the Soviet Union, which became central to the stability of the EC’s own 
border regions. As a consequence, the EU began prioritizing development programs 
in states to the East and on the immediate rim of the Mediterranean, to the detri-
ment of former colonies.
External factors were also impacting onto the EU-ACP “special relationship” 
agreed in 1975, including powerful economic pressures from international financial 
institutions such as the World Bank. These agencies were critical of obstacles to mar-
ket liberalization and the single market system advocated by the EU and portrayed 
“third country” trade deals as an obstruction to the unification of market forces within 
the fifteen Member States. The flaw in the system – divergence – had been flagged up 
during the negotiations on Lomé II and was to persist as an issue into its subsequent 
third and fourth rounds. The 1980 Focke Report to the European Parliament revealed 
drifting relationships and signaled a profound ideological drift as much of Western 
Europe moved towards a more neo-liberal consensus. It stated that “The structure 
of ACP-EEC trade reveals an acute imbalance… The rule of free trade is meaning-
less for countries which, at the present stage, because of their production structures, 
have practically nothing to export to the Community” (European Parliament, 1980: 
14; also see Hewitt, 1993; Amin, 1982: 23–30) In a system increasingly fixated by 
market competition, a situation where countries had “practically nothing to export” 
confused the relationship and the type of development envisaged in Europe. Asso-
ciationism was under immense pressure at this point.
Developing countries were recurrently suffering from falling commodity prices 
due to fluctuating markets and an escalating debt crisis through the 1980s, which 
increasingly tied their economies to World Bank (and other) loans and the debt cycle 
that came with this. It meant that EC projects were becoming ineffective in more 
vulnerable developing countries and were failing to prevent a cycle of economic 
meltdown. By the end of the decade, these problems were compounded by the col-
lapse of command state socialism. This resulted in the reunification of Germany 
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and the need for the EU to commit resources to struggling economies in Eastern 
Europe. It contributed to a layering of complications for ACP countries, which, by 
the time of the Lomé IV negotiations in 1988–89, had doubled their debt liabilities 
to developed countries and the World Bank, with finding it difficult to trade, and 
were becoming vulnerable to inter-regional conflicts. In quantifiable terms, the pov-
erty gap between ACP and EU countries was widening. In 1981, ACP debt stood at 
$ 65 billion, but by 1986 it had reached a staggering $ 130 billion (Ravenhill, 1993: 
42: Amin, 1982: 23–30).
Between the conclusion of Lomé I and the signing of Lomé IV on 15 December 
1989, the Lomé II and Lomé III agreements had become largely ineffectual in encour-
aging a mutually beneficial process of development. The geo-political shifts of the 
Western World carried it to a point where association in its historic form was deemed 
redundant. The EC was moving towards US style competition and business-like 
bespoke contractual arrangements. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) Uruguay Round brought further pressures on the culture of partnership, 
with its drive towards establishing globalizing free markets where governments would 
seek to “roll-back” state intervention in the economy. Significantly, this economic 
development strategy actively sought to infringe on the protections which Lomé had 
afforded ACP states. Neo-liberal economics quickly disadvantaged less developed 
markets and producers. The most vulnerable within this global realignment were 
African economies, which struggled to get any semblance of equitable engagement. 
According to Bretherton and Vogler: “… the principles underlying the entire edifice 
of Community development co-operation were increasingly challenged by the influ-
ence of neo-liberal economic orthodoxy, with its reliance upon non-interventionist, 
market strategies” (Bretherton, Vogler, 1999: 119).
Lomé was renegotiated on three occasions. Lomé II (running from January 1981 
to February 1985) saw an increase in aid provision and financial investment. The 
Lomé III Convention came into force in March 1985, renewing and refining trade 
provisions and expired in 1990. At each round of negotiation, financial support 
was increased and targeted in ways matching European economic shifts. Lomé IV, 
signed in December 1989, was to cover the years 1990 to 1999. These negotiations 
went on throughout the late 1980s, with ECU 12 billion to be allocated in its first 
five-year program. At this point 71 African, Caribbean and Pacific former colonies 
were included (EC, 1995a; EC, 1995b). Despite the growth and transfer of invest-
ment, the later Lomé negotiations resulted in the imposition of political conditions 
on development aid to developing countries, tying the partners to EC defined con-
straints. Apart from revising the time scales within which programs were operating, 
from five to ten years, additional criteria were added to the existing Lomé provisions.
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The new criteria included provisos such as respect for human rights, democratic 
principles and the Western application of the rule of law. Support was subject to the 
understanding that political criteria “underpins relations between the ACP states and 
the Community and all the provisions of the Convention” (EC,1995b: also see EC, 
1995a, and EC, 2000). Indeed, Article 5 of the Lomé IV Convention on human rights 
was imposed in such a way as to exclude a number of ACP countries from participat-
ing in trade with the EC. New EC criteria levied against ACP countries included con-
trolling their increasing debt to the financial institutions of the developed world and 
ensuring that there was also commitment to environmental protection and “regional 
economic integration.” The EC also demanded evidence and monitoring of sustain-
able economic and political development policies in ACP countries (Dinan, 1999: 
506). President Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya, in a statement to the ACP Committee of 
Ambassadors at ACP House in Brussels on 17 June 2016, summed up the demise 
of associationism and Lomé: “Developments such as the end of the Cold War and 
the establishment of the WTO resulted in a major policy shift away from the ACP, 
lessening the appetite for the ACP within the EU. After the end of the Cold War the 
geopolitical significance of the ACP as a Group diminished as eastward expansion 
gained momentum” (Kenyatta, 2016).
As the adaptation out of associationism continued, ACP countries were to find 
it increasingly difficult to comply with EC stipulations or to export commodities 
to Europe. With the introduction of Europe-wide standards and regulations on 
produce, African producers struggled, and the trade flow increasingly divested into 
European controlled commodities such as copper, coffee, cocoa beans, etc. Without 
significant investment, the ACP producers could not compete. The larger Member 
States of the EC were particularly preoccupied with the internal single market strat-
egy during the Lomé IV negotiation. The debates reflected the economistic priori-
ties of the Council of Ministers at the time. For the vast majority of representatives 
from ACP states, the new trade and aid regulations signaled a return to paternal-
ism and on the circuit of negotiations the term “Fortress Europe” was voiced for the 
first time. The African response became accusative, the “… Organisation for African 
Unity (OAU) put the blame on factors outside the control of African governments, 
such as the legacy of colonial exploitation, dependence on commodity exports and 
falling terms of trade” (Faber, 2004: 5). During the Lomé IV negotiations, the ACP 
countries’ cycle of dependency on Western financial aid, in the context of the spi-
raling debt crisis, was reflected in the former colonies’ declining influence. The ACP 
negotiating position was further weakened by political and economic instability 
on the domestic front, and marginal influence with the EC. This power imbalance 
facilitated the EU move away from the partnership. The EDF – the dedicated budget 
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for development policy – had increased marginally, but the EC commitment was 
not proportionate to address the problems being accrued by ACP countries, par-
ticularly in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Going towards the close of Lomé and away from the original intentions of devel-
opment cooperation between former colonies and European colonial powers, the 
concept of “Fortress Europe” reflected the protectionist policies of EC states regarding 
the movement of people and products from developing countries to Europe. When 
the review of Lomé IV was finally signed off in mid-1995 in Mauritius, the role of 
the EU in relation to ACP countries could be seen as one of a benign competitor. 
The exclusion of countries from EU programs for not complying with their criteria 
would become routine, yet there was no agreed interpretation of what good gov-
ernance would involve in practice. The most visible difficulties regarding trade and 
aid with ACP countries came not from developing nations themselves, but emerged 
between Germany, France, and the UK over the allocation of development invest-
ment. This was due to the fact that the signatories of the Lomé IV Convention rep-
resented individual EC Member States in their own right and not the Community 
per se. For example, during the talks in Mauritius, France was concerned with the 
low levels of EDF support and urged an increase. Alternatively, Germany and the UK 
were seeking to reduce their EDF contributions. At a particularly strained agreement 
at the Cannes Intergovernmental Summit of June 1995, original commitments were 
reduced globally, with the UK alone reducing its contribution by 23 per cent (Faber, 
Roelfsema, 1997: 367–386).
The revisions which occurred in what became known as Lomé IV B (1995–
2000) introduced a series of new policy objectives for the (by then) EU Member 
States, including: a concept of sustainability where projects would have to become 
economically self-sustaining; a recommitment to the global market system; a con-
solidation of the democratic rule of law and human rights, particularly in relation 
to women’s rights; and a focus on poverty reduction. Beyond this series of quali-
fications, the institutional bureaucracy was to emerge as a central obstacle to the 
smooth implementation of the range of policies, with responsibility for the devel-
opment policy within the EU being divided up among three separate commission-
ers, two directorate-generals (DG IB, covering the Southern Mediterranean, Mid-
dle East, Latin America, South and East Asia, and DG VIII on development) and 
a special office (European Community Humanitarian Office – ECHO). The ACP 
leaders did not have a single point of contact, frustrating negotiations and engage-
ment. This heavily layered structure was complicated further when the European 
Parliament (EP) gained influence over the implementation of policies by attaining 
approval powers over budgets and expenditure. By the end of the 1990s, the EU 
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links with the developing countries were silting up with a heavily layered bureau-
cracy that did not understand associationism.
Arguably, the liberalization of trading mechanisms became the rationale behind 
policy changes, coinciding with international shifts in the manner in which govern-
ments dealt with assistance and preferential trading agreements. The development 
strategy of the EU at this stage had tenure going back to the Yaoundé Convention, 
an acknowledged series of practical engagements with ACP counties. It was also 
a reflection of changes to the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), which had shaped 
the trade and political association with third countries since the earliest years of the 
Community. It is worth noting that while the complexity of the Lomé Convention 
was causing problems for EU-ACP relations at a diplomatic level, complementarity 
became functional, and in these developing regions recognized its worth. Indeed, 
African leaders found the contribution to be supportive in the broadest of senses, 
irrespective of motives. Between the years 1986 and 1998, EU financial support alone 
to ACP states was the equivalent of 30 billion euros, the vast bulk of which (77 per 
cent) was disbursed through the Lomé structures (Jones, 2001: 416).
* * *
With the establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995 and the 
EU’s attempts to position itself as an active driver of the global economy in compe-
tition to the USA, Lomé with its support mechanism and leaning toward protective 
markets was running counter to the prevailing economic orthodoxy of EU policy 
makers (Apecu, 2010: 29–67). World Bank mismanagement and the resulting debt 
crises, divergence in key development indicators (such as Gross Domestic Prod-
uct (GDP), life expectancy, etc.) between the EU and the ACP regions, commodity 
prices fluctuating, the power imbalances that emerged during the dialogue, pres-
sures to liberalize markets, and increasing dependency on aid, meant that there was 
an EU driven demand for changes to the ACP’s relationship. Even the backbone of 
the EU development policy, the European Development Fund – which was a lifeline 
for many communities – was questioned, only retrieved by the French during the 
review of the agreement in 1995. Lomé, with all its constraints, provided an agreed 
framework for intercontinental development policy and set out actions that could 
provide evidence of progress. It could be measured by interventions such as: the 
comprehensive nature of the involvement, its mutuality; the agreed institutional and 
logistic structures which facilitated action; the principle of negotiation on activities 
– that is, joint-decision making; regular and generous funding; a bureaucracy that 
was transparent although cumbersome; ACP beneficiaries were able to work as an 
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entourage and negotiated as such; and significantly, the ACP states themselves found 
Lomé developmental.
Conversely, the problems that the EU was to table against Lomé were to swing the 
pendulum against this open style of development intervention and towards a more 
globalizing market focus. In effect, Africa would have to compete on the global mar-
ket like everyone else. What was notable as the global market contorted out of the 
eighties, was that the unregulated drive of the financial markets affected the lever-
age on power that the dozens of developing countries had had under Lomé. ACP 
power had become weaker, their influence had been undermined and dismissed, 
and neo-colonial attitudes reemerged in European capitals. The EU believed that it 
no longer had the structures in place to efficiently deal with developing countries 
and ACP trade with the EU went down year after year. Debt was economically crip-
pling the ACP states and their development. Many regions continued to slip into 
underdevelopment, characterized by food insecurity, widespread poverty, conflict 
and migration (Jones, 2001: 420).
Any system following on from the Lomé system was merely a compromise, embed-
ding the difficulties that had affected development policy since the 1980s. It had served 
its purpose; macro-economic circumstances had altered significantly in the post-
Cold War era and there was a general acknowledgement that globalization demanded 
a new arrangement. In practice, many of the ACP states found it impossible to adapt 
to global market liberalization and consequently, the value of their goods, trade and 
influence declined. It was all compounded by the establishment of the WTO, which 
set itself the task of forcing open markets that had previously been based on prefer-
ence and co-operative arrangements – such as Lomé I. Times had changed and the 
Member States of the EU were becoming more fixated with the fluctuations of their 
own economies, focusing more on protecting their own markets and networks. The 
Common Agricultural Policy of the EU became the most obvious example of this, 
with almost 9,000 tariffs set against imports to the EU, most against African farm-
ers who, if given the opportunity, could produce more competitively than EU farm-
ers. There was also the problem of ad hoc interventions by the EU that carried both 
bureaucratic delay and a partisanship symptomatic of the EU system in general. The 
case in point was the “patchwork” nature of the EU relationship with Africa, where 
there continued (and continues) to exist a multitude of competing and overlapping 
policy frameworks and funding instruments.
The seven decades of the European partnership with former colonies had been 
a journey of contrasting engagements, with periods of seemingly positive inter-
connectivity countered by defensiveness and competitiveness. The chronology 
is important in accessing this developmental process, where there were obvious 
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periods of practical exchange followed by a divergence of interests and exploitative 
disengagement. This can be recognized through from Yaoundé and Lomé I when 
obvious enhancement in the standard of living across Africa can be discerned, but 
stands in contrast to the later programs which were seemingly driven by European 
caution and distraction through the emerging neo-liberal agendas of the period. 
Lessons were learned in the early associationism and still stand as examples of 
the possibility of genuine partnership without recourse to the destructiveness of 
more recent traits.
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